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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 19801 (CERCLA or Superfund Act) imposes
very broad liability on certain parties for the cleanup of sites with ex-
isting or threatened hazardous waste contamination. Although CER-
CLA contains a so-called "secured creditor exemption,"2 several courts
have concluded that secured creditors may be held liable for cleaning
up contaminated sites owned or operated by their borrowers.3
The financial community's apprehension over interpretation of the
secured creditor exemption intensified in the wake of United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp.,4 a highly controversial decision from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Fleet Factors5 is the
first appellate decision interpreting the scope of the secured creditor
exemption. In Fleet Factors a lender foreclosed on its security interest
in the debtor's inventory and equipment and took steps to liquidate the
collateral.' It did not foreclose on the real property, a cloth printing
facility.7 The United States alleged that during the sale and removal of
equipment from the debtor's plant, toxic chemicals and asbestos were
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (hereinafter CERCLA) (codified in part as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)) (Sections of the Superfund Act will be cited in
footnotes as CERCLA, followed by the citation to U.S.C.).
2. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
3. See infra notes 134-214 and accompanying text.
4. 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1552. For a more detailed discussion of Fleet Factors, see infra notes 180-96 and
accompanying text.
7. Id.
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released.8 The Eleventh Circuit narrowly construed the secured creditor
exemption and held that the facts were sufficient to make out a case of
liability against Fleet Factors Corporation." In affirming the denial of
Fleet's motion for summary judgment, the court announced the follow-
ing standard of liability: "[A] secured creditor may incur
[Superfund] liability, without being an operator, by participating in the
financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to
influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes."'" The ex-
pressed intent of the court's holding in Fleet Factors is to commission
lenders as environmental police.1"
As a result of Fleet Factors and its forerunners, an impassioned
controversy is raging over whether, and under what conditions, a se-
cured lender should be held liable for the cleanup of contaminated col-
lateral. Under CERCLA's liability scheme, an "owner or operator" 2
of a hazardous site is strictly liable 3 for its cleanup. But, the secured
creditor exemption excludes from the scope of "owner or operator" any
"person, who without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security in-
terest in the vessel or facility."1 4
Because CERCLA was virtually silent 5 on the meaning of the se-
cured creditor exemption, lenders have little guidance on what activi-
ties might subject them to liability. Indeed, when CERCLA was in its
infancy, secured creditors gave little thought to its ramifications for the
lending industry. 6 But, as courts broadly interpreted CERCLA's lia-
bility provisions, it became clear that the secured creditor exemption
would not be a safe harbor for lenders. 17 As the spectre of immense
8. Id. at 1553.
9. Id. at 1557.
10. Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added).
11. Id. at 1558.
12. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(A).
13. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2).
14. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
15. CERCLA was hastily drafted, near the end of the 96th Congress, in a "cut-and-paste"
fashion, with no conference report on the statute as enacted. As one court noted about the
Superfund Act: "It was hastily, and, therefore, inadequately drafted. Even the legislative history
must be read with caution since last minute changes in the bill were inserted with little or no
explanation." United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983).
16. Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Creditors, and
Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509 (1986).
17. E.g., United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa.
1985); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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liability for borrowers' environmental damage grew, many lenders be-
gan to consider environmental liability for the first time in the loan
approval process. 18
In response to lenders' concerns, several legislative proposals were
introduced in the 101st Congress which would limit CERCLA liability
of lenders and related governmental entities." In addition to the pri-
vate lending industry, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),20 Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 2 and Small Business Ad-
ministration (SBA) strongly endorse a legislative move to protect
lenders." The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), on the
other hand, is advocating an "administrative fix" to the situation.23 An
unusual alliance of environmental groups and chemical industry repre-
sentatives favor the EPA proposal and strongly oppose legislation to
alter the CERCLA liability scheme.2
The Superfund Act created a complex and controversial program
to address the massive problem of cleaning up the nation's inactive and
abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites. In general, CERCLA's pri-
mary features are (1) authorization for the federal government to re-
spond to hazardous substance releases,25 (2) creation of the Hazardous
Substance Response Trust Fund or "Superfund," a $1.6 billion revolv-
18. Burcat, supra note 16.
19. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (To amend the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to limit the liability under that Act of lending
institutions acquiring facilities through foreclosure or similar means and corporate fiduciaries ad-
ministering estates or trusts); H.R. 4076, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (To amend the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to exempt a Federal
department, agency, or instrumentality from liability under that Act when a facility is conveyed to
the department, agency, or instrumentality due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, aban-
donment, or similar means); S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (To improve the administration
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and to make technical amendments to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act).
20. Hearing on Lender Liability Under Superfund, H.R. 4494, Before the Subcomm. on
Transp. and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990) (statement of David C. Cooke, Resolution Trust Corporation) (hereinafter Lender Liabil-
ity Hearing).
21. Lender Liability Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of Steven A. Selig, Director, Divi-
sion of Liquidation, FDIC).
22. IV Superfund Rep. (Inside EPA) No. 17, at 3-5 (Aug. 15, 1990); id. No. 16, at 4-5
(Aug. 1, 1990); 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 533-34 (July 27, 1990); id. at 344 (June 15, 1990).
23. Lender Liability Hearing, supra note 11 (statement of James Strock, Assistant Admin.
for Enforcement, EPA); IV Superfund Rep. (Inside EPA) No. 18, at 9 (Aug. 29, 1990); id. No.
17, at 3-5 (Aug. 15, 1990).
24. See reports cited supra note 22.
25. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-9606.
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ing fund to pay for emergency responses,6 (3) creation of an Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry," and (4) imposition of lia-
bility for cleanup costs on broadly defined classes of "potentially re-
sponsible parties."28 CERCLA was overhauled in 1986, including an
$8.5 billion replenishment of the Superfund, by the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).2 9
Not surprisingly, the most controversial provisions of the
Superfund Act are those which impose liability on private parties for
the costs of hazardous waste cleanup. CERCLA imposes liability on
four broad classes of parties associated with hazardous waste disposal
facilities-past and present owners and operators,30 generators 3 1 and
transporters.32 These liability-imposing provisions have spawned consid-
erable litigation.3 3
Early cost recovery actions under CERCLA concentrated on the
liability of hazardous waste generators 4 and the standard of liability to
26. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9631.
27. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i).
28. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
29. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (hereinafter SARA) (codified in part at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)).
30. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2).
31. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
32. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
33. As of November 1986, 115 CERCLA cases, several of which were cost recovery actions,
were pending in the courts. 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1261 (Nov. 28, 1986) (quoting F. Henry Hab-
icht, Assistant Attorney General for the Land and Natural Resources Division, United States
Justice Department). A WESTLAW search on Sept. 20, 1990, located 125 federal district court
decisions in separate cases regarding cost recovery under CERCLA. Search terms: title ("United
States") & CERCLA & ((107) (42 +5 9607)). In the search, multiple decisions in the same
proceeding were counted as one, and decisions on other aspects of CERCLA were not included.
Superfund cost recovery litigation continues to proliferate. During the first three quarters of
fiscal 1990, EPA made 82 civil judicial referrals to the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) for Superfund cost recovery. This figure is up from 74 in fiscal 1989 and 48 in fiscal 1988
for the same period. Telephone interview with William H. Frank, Special Assistant to the Assis-
tant Administrator for Enforcement, EPA, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1990). Superfund cases
represented a high proportion of all EPA civil judicial referrals to DOJ during the last three years
(the following statistics are for the first three quarters of the years shown): 82/191 in 1990, 74/
183 in 1989, and 48/216 in 1988. Id.
34. E.g., United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983) (A past nonnegligent
offsite generator may be held strictly liable for hazardous waste cleanup under CERCLA); see
Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability, 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,224 (June 1984); Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for
Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 144 & n.21 (hereinaf-
ter Comment, Liability of Financial Institutions); Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability:
Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261, 1266 (1987).
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be imposed.3" While these early decisions presented the courts with
some difficulties, primarily in interpreting ambiguous statutory provi-
sions of CERCLA, there was no conceptual dilemma in imposing lia-
bility on parties which had generated hazardous waste. This theme was
voiced by Judge Newcomer in one of the first decisions on CERCLA
liability: "What is clear, however, is that the Act is intended to facili-
tate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste dump sites and when possi-
ble to place the ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for the
danger created by such sites."36
However, armed with the "overwhelmingly remedial" 37 goal of
CERCLA, the courts have expansively interpreted the scope of liability
for Superfund cleanups. In doing so, courts more recently have focused
on the meaning of "owner or operator" for determining liability under
CERCLA section 107(a).38 As courts impose CERCLA liability on
parties whose relationships with actual waste disposal activities are
more attenuated, 9 the "polluter pays" principle"° is a less appealing
justification for their decisions.
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the current status and
35. See infra notes 94-115 and accompanying text.
36. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Wade II). "An
essential purpose of CERCLA is to place the ultimate responsibility for the clean-up of hazardous
waste on 'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison.' " Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (lth Cir. 1990) (quoting
United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989), and Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)).
37. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (l1th Cir. 1990); Florida
Power & Light Co., 893 F.2d at 1317; United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986) (hereinafter NEPACCO); United States v. New Castle
County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 859 (D. Del. 1989).
38. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a) (definition of "owner or operator"); CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(2) (imposing liability on owners and operators); see Comment, CERCLA
1985: A Litigation Update, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,395 (Dec. 1985); Comment,
Liability of Financial Institutions, supra note 34, at 144; Note, supra note 34.
39. Examples of "remote" parties found liable for Superfund cleanups are: non-foreclosing
lenders, Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550; residential real estate developers, Tanglewood East Home-
owners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988); officers-stockholders, New York
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); parent corporation, United States v.
Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); foreclosing lenders, United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); nonnegligent past offsite generators, United
States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983).
40. The term "polluter pays" principle is a shorthand description of the broad policy under-
lying CERCLA's liability provisions. See Atkeson, Goldberg, Ellrod & Connors, An Annotated
Legislative History of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 10,360, 10,369 n.89 (Dec. 1986) (hereinafter Atkeson, Annotated
SARA History); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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future trends of lender liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs
under CERCLA. Because the Superfund Act was unenlightening as to
the meaning of the secured creditor exemption, the analysis begins with
a brief discussion of federal environmental regulation and an overview
of CERCLA. This background is helpful for analyzing the lender lia-
bility controversy in light of the policy considerations which guided
Congress in Superfund's passage. Next, the Comment discusses judicial
interpretations of lender liability and the secured creditor exemption.
Finally, industry reaction to those decisions, particularly Fleet Factors,
is examined, and proposals for change are reviewed.
II. MODERN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the
struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of
social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing.
There is yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to
the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus'
slave-girls, is still property. The land-relation is still strictly economic,
entailing privileges but not obligations.
The extension of ethics to this ... element in human environment
is, if I read the evidence correctly, an evolutionary possibility and an
ecological necessity .... Individual thinkers since the days of Ezekiel
and Isaiah have asserted that the despoliation of land is not only inex-
pedient but wrong. Society, however, has not yet affirmed their belief.
I regard the present conservation movement as the embryo of such an
affirmation."1
This prophetic statement by Aldo Leopold was first published in
1949, about twenty years before "Earth Day," considered by many to
have signaled the beginning of the environmental decade of the
1970s.' 2 During 1970, a groundswell of public concern for the environ-
41. A. LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC WITH ESSAYS ON CON-
SERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 238-39 (1970).
42. On April 22, 1970, the nation witnessed a remarkable outpouring of widespread,
public concern: several million Americans in communities all across the country took
part in an event called Earth Day. On that day environmental education programs were
presented at thousands of grade schools; the National Education Association estimated
that 10 million school children participated. Teach-ins were held at several thousand
high schools and colleges, and hundreds of thousands of students collected litter from
parks, city streets, and suburban neighborhoods. Mass demonstrations were held in cit-
ies like Philadelphia, Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C. Automobile traffic
1991]
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:209
ment surfaced-and politicians responded. In that year, President
Nixon established the first Council on Environmental Quality, the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency.43 These new enforcers of the environment were
termed Nixon's "policemen for pollution." 44
Congress ushered in the environmental era with the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). "5 NEPA set the philosophical
tone for federal environmental laws by stating lofty societal goals4" and
requiring governmental agencies to protect environmental quality in all
aspects of their programs.47 Later in 1970, Congress set the regulatory
tone for federal environmental laws by passing the Clean Air Act
(CAA),4 8 considered by some to be the "most complex, expensive, and
pervasive of the federal regulatory environmental statutes. ' 49 Despite
the CAA's burdensome requirements, its enactment was supported by a
"breathtaking unanimity of national purpose."5
During the 1970s, Congress totally revamped the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA or Clean Water Act),51 enacted the
was banned from a part of downtown Manhattan, and Congress adjourned to allow
members to speak at environmental rallies across the country. As the Washington Post
reported, on Earth Day millions of Americans 'demonstrated . . . their practical concern
for a liveable environment on this earth.'
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1989); see also COUN-
CIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 1-15 (1979); F. ANDERSON. D.
MANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 3-13 (1984).
43. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1989), supra note 42, at 149.
44. Id.
45. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (hereinafter NEPA) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988)). Congress actually passed NEPA in late 1969. NEPA was signed
into law on January 1, 1970.
46. NEPA's stated purpose was:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important
to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
47. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
48. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (hereinafter CAA) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988)).
49. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, supra note 42, at 118.
50. Id. at 132. Congress passed the Clean Air Act by votes of 73-0 in the Senate and 374-1
in the House of Representatives. Id.
51. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (hereinafter FWPCA or Clean Water Act)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)). FWPCA's 1972 amendments set forth
supernal goals for the nation's waters: (1) eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 52 and passed many
other environmental regulatory statutes.5" Federal pollution laws en-
acted prior to CERCLA generally have several characteristics in com-
mon: (1) they are almost exclusively prospective in application; (2)
they have a paternal quality, guiding industry's conduct to reduce pol-
lution at its source (control rather than cleanup); (3) the regulated
community is directly connected with the source of pollutants being
controlled; and (4) the cost of a cleaner environment is placed on in-
dustries whose activities pollute the resource (and ultimately on
consumers) .
Two federal statutory provisions prior to CERCLA did impose lia-
bility on certain parties for pollution cleanup. The first is section 311 of
the Clean Water Act. 55 The second is RCRA's "imminent hazard"
provision.5
A. Section 311 of the Clean Water Act
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act 57 established "owner and op-
erator" liability for discharges of oil or hazardous substances into navi-
gable waters of the United States. Owners and operators58 of vessels or
facilities which discharge oil or a hazardous substance are strictly lia-
ble for cleanup costs59 and subject to civil penalties.60 Congress explic-
itly incorporated the standard of strict liability imposed by section 311
waters by 1985; and (2) wherever attainable, waters should be fishable and swimmable by mid-
1983. These lofty declarations echoed the pervasive public sentiment favoring environmental val-
ues. While the goals are unenforceable per se, courts have used these goals to justify broad con-
struction of FWPCA's provisions. E.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. United States EPA, 760 F.2d 549
(1985).
52. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (hereinafter RCRA) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)).
53. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1989), supra note 42, at 150-53 for a list
of federal environmental regulatory statutes.
54. See e.g., CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7412; CWA, 42 U.S.C. § 1311; see also Cahan,
Business Transactions: A Guide Through the Wilderness, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer
1990, at 25-26..
55. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
56. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a).
57. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
58. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(6) (definition of "owner or operator").
59. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f); e.g., United States v. West of Eng. Ship Owner's Mut.
Protection & Indem. Ass'n, 872 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1989).
60. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6); e.g., United States v. New York, 481 F. Supp. 4
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), affid without opinion, 614 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936.
1991]
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:209
of the FWPCA into CERCLA's liability scheme.61
However, unlike CERCLA, liability under section 311 of the
Clean Water Act has only prospective application. The Clean Water
Act does not cover discharges which occurred prior to passage of sec-
tion 311.11 Furthermore, although liability under section 311 is strict
(i.e., without fault), interpreting courts generally require a showing of
proximate cause on the part of the owner or operator before liability
attaches.6"
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)
provides a "prospective cradle-to-grave regulatory regime governing the
movement of hazardous waste in our society."6 RCRA completed the
trilogy of federal statutes controlling the prospective introduction of
pollutants into the environment-air, water, and land. Like the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act, RCRA created a complex, comprehen-
sive, and direct regulatory program.6 5 RCRA's regulatory provisions
focus on safe treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes.
66
61. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) states: "The term 'liable' or 'liability' under this sub-
chapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of Title
33."
62. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) states: "The discharge of oil or hazardous substances
... in such quantities as may be harmful ... is prohibited." Liability for removal costs attaches
only when "oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of subsection b(3)." Id., 9
1321(f)(1) (emphasis added).
63. "Given its statutory language and legislative history, it is clear that section 1321(f)(1) is
causation-based and not fault-based." West of Eng. Ship Owner's, 872 F.2d at 1197. See United
States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that an oil discharge must be
sufficiently foreseeable to result in liability under section 311).
64. INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE COMM., H.R. REP. No. 1016, pt. 1, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6120 (hereinafter CER-
CLA History; page references are to U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News).
65. Generally, the RCRA's objectives include: (1) technical and financial assistance for de-
veloping solid waste management plans; (2) training grants for solid waste disposal occupations;
(3) prohibition of open dumping; (4) promulgation and enforcement of standards for proper solid
and hazardous waste management practices; (5) promotion of research, development, demonstra-
tion, and construction of improved waste management systems and resource conservation systems;
and (6) establishment of a federal-state "partnership" to further the purposes of the Act. RCRA,
42 U.S.C. § 6902(a).
66. Waste generators must comply with strict requirements for recordkeeping, reporting,
labeling, container use, and information exchange. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6922. RCRA also created
a manifest system for complete tracking of hazardous waste shipments. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6923.
And, treatment, storage, and disposal facilities must comply with performance standards through
a certification and permit program. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924-6925.
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RCRA also authorizes EPA to force responsible parties6 7 to clean
up a site contaminated by improper hazardous waste handling if the
waste poses "an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment." 8 Under RCRA, a party must have "contributed to"
the activities which caused the contamination to be liable for cleanup
costs.6 9 The statute also authorizes EPA to impose financial responsibil-
ity requirements on owners and operators to ensure their ability to pay
cleanup costs and compensate for injuries.7
III. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA
A. Policy Underlying CERCLA-Legislative History
Congress enacted CERCLA to address the immense problem of
environmental contamination caused by the nation's inactive and aban-
doned hazardous waste sites.71 Congress hotly debated the extent of the
problem. Proponents of the bill cited a 1979 EPA study which esti-
mated 30,000 to 50,000 inactive and uncontrolled hazardous waste
sites, of which 1,200 to 2,000 likely presented serious public health
risks.72 Based on the investigation of a few problem sites, a House sub-
committee concluded that four characteristics were common: "(1) The
sites contain large quantities of hazardous waste .... (2) Unsafe de-
sign and disposal methods are widespread .... (3) The danger to the
environment is substantial . . . . (4) Many sites pose major health
hazards."'73 The investigation included such notorious sites as Love Ca-
nal and the Valley of the Drums. 4
The bill's opponents blasted the EPA study as "little better than
pure guesswork," and offered contradictory studies with estimates as
low as 431 potentially hazardous sites. 75 Later studies, however, have
67. Responsible parties include "any past or present generator, past or present transporter,
or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility." RCRA, 42
U.S.C. § 6973(a).
68. Id.
69. Id. This causation element is absent from CERCLA's liability scheme. See infra notes
112-15 and accompanying text.
70. In response, EPA imposed mandatory insurance requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 264.140 to
.151 (1989).
71. CERCLA History, supra note 64, at 6119.
72. Id. at 6120.
73. Id. at 6121-22.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 6147 (Dissenting views of Representatives Stockman and Loeffler). In their dis-
sent, Stockman and Loeffler argued that "there has never existed, especially in recent times, a
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largely borne out EPA's estimates. By 1989, EPA had inventoried
about 27,000 hazardous waste sites and placed 1,077 on the National
Priorities List.76
Congress recognized that RCRA was inadequate to deal with the
problem of inactive and abandoned sites. CERCLA was explicitly
designed to fill RCRA's "important regulatory gaps."" One shortcom-
ing of RCRA's cleanup. provision is that it only applies to sites that
pose an "imminent" hazard.78 Even then, RCRA provides no solution
"if a financially responsible owner of the site cannot be located. 79
Congress also was dissatisfied with RCRA's inadequate funding and
EPA's slow enforcement progress. 80
After intense and protracted debate, CERCLA was enacted near
the end of the 96th Congress under a suspension of the rules prohibit-
ing amendments."1 Because of last minute changes and compromises,
the cut-and-paste bill which emerged had little recorded legislative his-
tory and no full committee report.8 1 Courts83 and commentators8" agree
regulatory or legal vacuum that permitted widespread gross irresponsibility and negligence in dis-
posal and storage, nor are we consequently faced today with a national landscape thickly littered
with industrial time bombs." Id. at 6146-47.
76. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 162-63 (1989).
77. CERCLA History, supra note 64, at 6125.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6124-25.
81. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1980); Comment,
Liability of Financial Institutions, supra note 34, at 145-46.
82. Grad, supra note 81.
83. "CERCLA is in fact a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague
terminology and deleted provisions .... The courts are once again placed in the undesirable and
onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation." United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838-39 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affid in part,
rev'd in part and remanded, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)
(hereinafter NEPACCO). "Because of the haste with which CERCLA was enacted, Congress was
not able to provide a clarifying committee report, thereby making it extremely difficult to pinpoint
the intended scope of the legislation." United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J.
1983). "Any attempt to divine the legislative intent behind many of [CERCLA's] provisions will
inevitably involve a resort to the Act's legislative history. Unfortunately, the legislative history is
unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements." United States v. Wade, 577 F.
Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Wade II). "Due to the legislative history of the act, the Com-
mittee Reports must be read with some caution." United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D. Minn. 1982).
84. Grad, supra note 81; Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Control,
33 BAYLOR L. REV. 253 (1981); Comment, Liability of Financial Institutions, supra note 34;
Note, supra note 34.
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that CERCLA's hasty passage resulted in vague provisions and a his-
tory which provides little help in determining Congress' intent.
Nevertheless, three basic premises of CERCLA's statutory scheme
seem clear. First, inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites pose a
serious problem of national magnitude.8 8 Second, the federal govern-
ment must have the necessary tools to effectively respond to the prob-
lem. 6 And third, polluters should pay for cleaning up hazardous sites
whenever possible.8"
B. Liability Under CERCLA-Potentially Responsible Parties
CERCLA imposes liability for costs of hazardous waste cleanup
on four broad classes of potentially responsible parties (PRPs). First,
the current owner or operator of a vessel or facility from which there is
a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance may be held
liable regardless of when the release occurred. 88 Second, CERCLA im-
poses liability on persons who owned or operated a facility in the past,
during which time a hazardous substance was disposed of at the site. 9
Third, generators of hazardous substances who arranged for the trans-
portation, treatment, or disposal of hazardous substances at another
party's facility may be liable for response costs at that facility. 90 Last,
CERCLA places liability on persons who transport hazardous sub-
stances to treatment or disposal facilities for releases at such facili-
ties.9 ' These classes of PRPs are generally referred to as current own-
ers and operators, past owners and operators, generators, and
transporters, respectively.
Liability imposed on PRPs is subject only to very narrow defenses.
To avoid liability, a PRP must establish that contamination was caused
solely by an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third
85. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
86. E.g., Wade H, 577 F. Supp. 1326,1331; Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1112.
87. "An essential purpose of CERCLA is to place the ultimate responsibility for the clean-
up of hazardous waste on 'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical
poison.'" Florida Power & Light Co., 893 F.2d at 1317 (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric.
Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989), and Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)); accord Wade 11, 577 F. Supp. 1326,
1331; Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112.
88. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
89. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
90. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
91. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
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party other than an employee of the PRP or anyone with which the
PRP has a contractual relationship (the "innocent landowner" or
"third party" defense). 92 To successfully assert the innocent landowner
defense, a PRP also must establish that he exercised due care and took
precautions to prevent foreseeable misconduct of a third party.93
C. Standard of Liability
1. Strict Liability
Liability under CERCLA is strict liability. Although strict liabil-
ity language was deleted from the final version of CERCLA, other fac-
tors strongly indicate congressional intent that strict liability applies to
PRPs.9' The most persuasive is Congress' explicit incorporation of the
standard of liability imposed by section 311 of the FWPCA.95 CER-
CLA section 101(32) states: "The term 'liable' or 'liability' under this
subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which ob-
tains under section 1321 of Title 33."96 Prior to CERCLA, courts fre-
quently held liability under the FWPCA to be strict. 97 For these rea-
sons, courts interpreting CERCLA have consistently applied strict
liability.98 Moreover, SARA's legislative history indicates that Con-
gress approves the application of strict liability under CERCLA: "As
under . . . [the FWPCA], liability under CERCLA is strict, that is,
without regard to fault or willfulness."99
92. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
93. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3); see generally ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE:
THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE FOR REAL ESTATE LENDERS, BUYERS, SELLERS, AND ATTOR-
NEYS (J. O'Brien & W. Frank, eds. 1989) (a detailed practical guide for conducting environmen-
tal due diligence to meet various statutory needs).
94. In United States v. Price, the court stated:
We note that although the term "strict" was deleted at the last minute; it still appears
that Congress intended to impose a strict liability standard subject only to the affirma-
tive defenses listed in § 107(b). This conclusion is reinforced by virtue of the fact that
Congress left the "due care" defense in the statute, a defense which would be rendered
meaningless in the absence of strict liability.
577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983) (citations omitted).
95. FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321.
96. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
97. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 844 (citing several decisions under FWPCA).
98. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); Tanglewood East Home-
owners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); in re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985); NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103; Wade II, 577
F. Supp. 1326; United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
99. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 253, pt. 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 74
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2. Joint and Several Liability
PRPs are jointly and severally liable under CERCLA unless the
harm from the hazardous substance release is reasonably divisible. 100
As with strict liability, language imposing joint and several liability
was deleted from the final version of CERCLA.' 0 ' However, Congress
intended that joint and several liability remain an option to be applied
by the courts when proper. In United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. the
court arrived at this conclusion based on several excerpts from the Con-
gressional Record including the following statement by Senator
Randolph:
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any,
shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common
law. An example is joint and several liability. Any reference to these
terms has been deleted, and the liability of joint tortfeasors will be
determined under common or previous statutory law.10
House discussion contained similar explanations.10 3
The Chem-Dyne court adopted a uniform rule of federal common
law fashioned after the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 433A,
433B, 875, and 881.104 Congress later confirmed the Chem-Dyne analy-
sis as correct in SARA's legislative history.' 0 5 Although the Chem-
Dyne rule allows courts to apportion liability if the harm is. divisible,
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2835, 2856 (hereinafter SARA
History; page references are to U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News).
100. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171; Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 n.13; Chem-Dyne, 572 F.
Supp at 806-07.
101. See cases cited supra note 100.
102. 572 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (quoting 126 Cong. Rec. S14,964 (daily ed.
Nov. 24, 1980)).
103. Id.
104. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. Section 433A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1965) provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where (a) there
are distinct harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.
Section 433B provides:
Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to
the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that
the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the appor-
tionment is upon each such actor.
105. "[N]othing in this bill is intended to change the application of the uniform federal rule
of joint and several liability enunciated by the Chem-Dyne court." SARA History, supra note 99,
at 2856.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
this seems a practical impossibility in most hazardous waste situa-
tions.106 Furthermore, the proponent bears the burden of proving a rea-
sonable basis for apportioning liability.1 0 7
3. Retroactive Application
It seems manifestly clear that CERCLA was intended to have ret-
roactive application due to its central purpose of cleaning up aban-
doned and inactive hazardous waste sites. 10 8 Several courts have con-
cluded that CERCLA's liability provisions apply retroactively to pre-
CERCLA activities.' 019 CERCLA's retroactive provisions do not violate
due process.1'0 Nor does CERCLA's liability scheme create an ex post
facto law or bill of attainder.1 '
4. The Causation Element
One of the most deeply rooted traditional elements of tort culpa-
bility is that of "but-for" causation." 2 Nevertheless, courts have re-
fused to require this element in imposing liability under CERCLA sec-
tion 107." a This conclusion is based on Congress' substitution of the
existing language in section 107 for prior language which imposed lia-
bility on "any person who caused or contributed to a release."", In
response to a causation argument by owner-defendants, the court in
United States v. Monsanto Co. stated: "The traditional elements of tort
culpability on which the site-owners rely simply are absent from the
statute. The plain language of section 107(a)(2) extends liability to
owners of waste facilities regardless of their degree of participation in
the subsequent disposal of hazardous waste.""' 5
106. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73.
107. Id.
108. One of the "regulatory gaps" of RCRA (which CERCLA was intended to fill) is
RCRA's primarily prospective application. CERCLA History, supra note 64, at 6125.
109. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 174; NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 732-34; United States v. Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605
F. Supp. 1064, 1069-73 (D. Colo. 1985).
110. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 174 (due process is satisfied by showing retroactive application
of the statute is justified by a rational legislative purpose).
Il1. Id.
112. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON. TORTS § 41 (1984).
113. E.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 168; Wade 11, 577 F. Supp. at 1333-34.
114. Wade I1, 577 F. Supp. at 1333 (quoting H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., §
3071(a)(1), 126 CONG. REC. at H9,459 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980)) (emphasis added); accord
Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1114 n.ll.
115. 858 F.2d at 168.
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The combination of strict, joint and several, and retroactive liabil-
ity, and the elimination of the traditional causation element, arguably
make CERCLA liability the most radical tort liability scheme ever de-
veloped. " ' Liability of parties described in section 107 is just short of
absolute, subject only to very narrow exceptions.11 7 Congressional oppo-
nents of the Superfund Act labeled it unfair and described it as a hy-
brid tort-welfare system.118 Courts, likewise, have recognized the inher-
ent unfairness of CERCLA in some applications.1 19
Thus, considering CERCLA's liability structure, one should avoid
the natural tendency to analyze its application in terms of "fairness."
CERCLA just isn't fair. It isn't fair for past nonnegligent offsite gener-
ators to be liable for cleaning up a landfill-but they are. 12 0 It isn't fair
for a site-owner to be liable even though he didn't contribute to the
presence of, or cause the release of, hazardous substances at his facil-
ity-but he is.121 Right or wrong, Congress created such a liability
structure to address the massive problem of hazardous waste
contamination. 122
This new breed of environmental regulation is a radical departure
from the familiar model of permits, effluent limitations, and ambient
standards to which industry has become accustomed. 12 3 While the "pol-
luter pays" principle is deeply ingrained in both types of control, the
116. See Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,
1465 (1986).
117. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
118. Moreover, the liability provisions of H.R. 7020 are not based on sound causation
principles. Common law tort theories provide a carefully structured system for use in
determining causation. This system, the product of centuries of efforts to devise a fair
and equitable formula, should not be lightly overturned in favor of loose causation prin-
ciples .... Welfare is the relief which society provides to parties who are in need, or
who have been injured and have no other source of relief. Tort law, however, is a sys-
tem which provides relief to injured parties by means of assigning responsibility and
accountability to some other individual or institution in society.... H.R. 7020 blurs the
distinction between a welfare system and a tort law system.
CERCLA History, supra note 64, at 6144 (views of Representatives Broyhill, Devine, Collins,
Loeffler, and Stockman).
119. "Though strict liability may impose harsh results on certain defendants, it is the most
equitable solution in view of the alternative-forcing those who bear no responsibility for causing
the damage, the taxpayers, to shoulder the full cost of the clean up." Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1114.
120. Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1103.
121. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1043-44.
122. This is not to say, of course, that the structure cannot be changed. The point is that an
analysis under the current statute should be cognizant of its inherent unfairness, rather than
search in vain for equitable principles which do not exist.
123. Under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, for example.
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old model is much more predictable in terms of costs. Prospective pol-
lution control requires the existing regulated community to conform to
cognizable standards, the costs of which may be budgeted and system-
atically spread to consumers.
IV. LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
Under CERCLA, an "owner or operator"' 2 of a hazardous waste
"facility" '125 is potentially liable 26 for response costs at that facility.
The statutory definition of "owner or operator" provides little help in
understanding its precise application. Stripped of its exceptions and de-
scriptions of vessels and facilities, the "definition" states only that an
"owner or operator" is a person "owning or operating" a vessel or
facility. 27
The so-called "secured creditor exemption" excludes from the
scope of "owner or operator" any "person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility."' 28
124. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
125. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
126. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
127. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). In United States v. Mirabile, the court noted:
"Were it not for the underscored exemption from liability, the definition would be a hopeless
tautology." 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
This is one area in which CERCLA's poor drafting and lack of reliable history is particularly
evident. Courts have taken divergent approaches to divining Congress' intended meaning of
"owner or operator." The court in T.P. Long simply stated that the definition was "not very
helpful" and held that a debtor's estate was an "owner" with little discussion. 45 Bankr. at 283-84
(noting broad construction of CERCLA's liabiiity provisions by other courts). In contrast, the
Maryland Bank & Trust court quoted extensively from the legislative history in considering the
terms. 632 F. Supp. at 577-80. However, the quoted excerpts accompanied earlier versions of the
bill which underwent many changes before CERCLA was enacted. See Grad, supra note 81. As
the court in Shore Realty explained:
The compromise contains many provisions closely resembling those from earlier ver-
sions of the legislation, and the House and Senate sponsors sought to articulate the
differences between the compromise and earlier versions. One of the sponsors claimed
that the version passed 'embodie[d] those features of the Senate and House bills where
there has been positive consensus' while 'eliminat[ing] those provisions which were
controversial.'
759 F.2d at 1040 (citations omitted). Thus, portions of the ultimate bill which retained some and
rejected other former provisions, are subject to diametrically opposed interpretations: (1) that
some of the provisions were deleted due to controversy, and thus, the former explanation is inap-
posite; and (2) that the retention of some or most of the former provisions indicates substantial
agreement on the prior meaning. Indeed, the court in T.P. Long noted that both parties "cited and
relied upon" the same definition in the legislative history. 632 F. Supp. at 578 n.3.
128. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). In SARA, Congress amended the definition of
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Nowhere does the Superfund Act or its history attempt to explain the
meaning of "participating in the management." 12 9 The most that safely
can be stated is that Congress intended to afford some protection to
secured creditors.
Some precursors to the final House version of CERCLA contained
language similar to the secured creditor exemption. One early version
read: "'owner' . . does not include a person who, without participation
in the management or operation of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility.' '13 0
However, several factors counsel against putting much, if any,
stock in this superseded provision or its associated commentary. First,
the above-quoted version referred to "management or operation." This
could indicate that the drafters considered the terms to have different
meanings; and therefore, management participation is not consistent
with operator status."' Alternatively, the drafters merely may have de-
leted what was thought to be a superfluous term. 32 Furthermore, the
Senate version of CERCLA initially lacked a secured creditor exemp-
tion. 133 So, even if the meaning of the initial House version was known,
it is not a reliable indication of Congress' intent in passing its last min-
ute compromise. The judicial decisions applying the secured creditor
exemption illustrate the problems created by the cryptic provision.
"owner or operator" to further exclude any "unit of State or local government" obtaining title or
control of a facility by "bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar
means." Conspicuously absent from the new exclusion are the federal government and private
lenders.
129. Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation Under Section
101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 927 (1989). Tom reasons that "the minimum that
could be meant by 'participating in the management,'" is involvement otherwise sufficient to im-
pose operator liability on a party. Id. at 927 n.17, 936. See also Lender Liability Hearing, supra
note 20, (statement of James P. O'Brien) (arguing that 'participation in the management' requires
the same level of control necessary to be deemed an 'operator').
130. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579 (quoting the first draft of the Compre-
hensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, H.R. 85, introduced May 15, 1979) (em-
phasis added).
131. But see supra note 129.
132. Which could lead to the conclusion that previous discussions of the superseded sections
would be applicable to the provision as enacted. See supra notes 127.
133. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558 n.11.
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A. Judicial Interpretation of the Secured Creditor Exemption
1. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.
In In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.' the court focused on whether
the secured creditor, BancOhio National Bank, acted "primarily to
protect its security interest." In that case, BancOhio held a perfected
security interest in the bankrupt debtor's "accounts receivable, equip-
ment, fixtures, inventory, and other personal property."' 5 BancOhio
had no interest in the real property, which the debtor had operated as a
rubber recycling plant. 36 The bankruptcy trustee auctioned off all of
the debtor's personal property except ninety drums of hazardous waste
which had been secretly buried on the site. 37
Following a release from the buried drums, EPA conducted a re-
sponse action and sought reimbursement from funds held by the trustee
and subject to BancOhio's security interest. a13  The bankruptcy court
held that BancOhio could not be held liable for cleanup costs because:
"The only possible indicia of ownership that can be attributed to
BancOhio is that which is primarily to protect its security interest.' 39
It was undisputed that BancOhio had not participated in the manage-
ment of the facility. "0 In dictum, the court added that "even if
BancOhio had repossessed its collateral pursuant to its security agree-
ment it would not be an 'owner or operator' as defined under
CERCLA.''
2. United States v. Mirabile
In United States v. Mirabile42 the court squarely addressed the
meaning of management participation under the secured creditor ex-
emption for the first time. Mirabile involved motions for summary
judgment by three secured lenders, American Bank & Trust Co.
134. 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
135. Id. at 280.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 281.
138. Id. at 287.
139. Id. at 289.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 288. The court viewed foreclosure as an act "primarily to protect the security
interest" of the secured creditor. This fact, the court implied, was the end of the inquiry unless the
lender also participated in management of the facility (an issue absent from this case). See Com-
ment, Liability of Financial Institutions, supra note 34, at 164.
142. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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(AB&T), Mellon Bank (East) National Association (Mellon), and the
Small Business Administration (SBA).14 The case arose after EPA
cleaned up a contaminated site (Turco site)' 44 and sued the Mirabiles,
current owners, for reimbursement."" The Mirabiles in turn joined
AB&T and Mellon as third party defendants, and the banks counter-
claimed against the United States based on SBA's involvement. 46
The court in Mirabile framed the issue of protection under the
secured creditor exemption as follows:
[T]he exemption plainly suggests that provided a secured creditor
does not become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owner or
operator of a facility, the creditor may not be held liable for cleanup
costs. The difficulty arises, of course, in determining how far a secured
creditor may go in protecting its financial interests before it can be
said to have acted as an owner or operator. 47
After considering the legislative history, the court concluded that
"Congress intended to draw a distinction between parties involved in
the actual operation of the facility and those who are involved in what
may properly be characterized as the financial aspects of the business
conducted at the facility." 4" The court in Mirabile developed the fol-
lowing standard for determining when a lender becomes "overly entan-
gled" to a degree which precludes application of the secured creditor
exemption: "[B]efore a secured creditor . . . may be held liable, it
must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects
of the site."
'1 49
In ruling on AB&T's motion for summary judgment, the Mirabile
court considered the following facts. AB&T foreclosed on the real
143. Id. at 20,994-95.
144. Turco Coatings, Inc. had used the site as a paint manufacturing facility. EPA removed
about 550 drums of hazardous wastes at a cost of nearly $250,000. United States v. Mirabile, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,993 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (related proceeding to principal
opinion discussed here).
145. Id. at 20,995. Other parties were involved which are not important for this discussion.
For a more complete analysis, see Note, supra note 34, at 1275-80; Comment, Liability of Finan-
cial Institutions, supra note 34, at 165-70.
146. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,995.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 20,995-96. The court noted that the polluter pays principle underlying CERCLA
"simply does not apply with the same force to secured creditors as it does" to persons more di-
rectly involved with waste disposal. Id. at 20,995.
149. Id. at 20,996. The opinion also referred to the "nuts-and-bolts, day-to-day production
aspects of the business." Id. at 20,995.
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property and was high bidder at the sheriff's sale.1 0 AB&T then as-
signed its high bid to the Mirabiles without ever receiving the deed. 15 1
Earlier, AB&T took steps to protect the property against vandalism,
inquired into waste disposal costs, and showed the property to prospec-
tive purchasers." 2 The court reasoned that foreclosure and passage of
title were unimportant because AB&T had merely acted to protect its
security interest in the property.16 3 The court concluded that AB&T's
involvement with the Turco site was limited to participation in financial
decisions.164 Therefore, the court granted AB&T's motion for summary
judgment.1 55
In Mirabile the SBA also prevailed based on the secured creditor
exemption.16 6 Although SBA had some apparent authority to partici-
pate in Turco's management, 1 7 the authority was never exercised.1 58
The court reiterated: "[P] articipation in purely financial aspects of op-
eration, of the sort which occurred here, is [in]sufficient to bring a
lender within the scope of CERCLA liability."1 9
Mellon's situation, however, presented a "cloudier situation."1 60
Two loan officers of Mellon's predecessor were involved in the troubled
manufacturer's business-one served on an advisory board (essentially
financial), and another had some degree of involvement in the produc-
tion and management aspects of the business.16 It was this latter in-
volvement which gave the court "pause," and raised an issue of fact for
trial.16 2
3. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 63 the court held
that a lender lost secured creditor protection by foreclosing on and tak-
150. Id. at 20,996.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 20,995.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 20,996-97.
157. By virtue of its loan contract with Turco. Id. at 20,997.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. But the court stated that the basis of the claim against Mellon was a "slender reed
indeed." Id.
163. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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ing title to contaminated property. In support, the court reasoned that
the bank's security interest "terminated at the foreclosure sale ...at
which time it ripened into full title."' 16"
Public policy arguments are prominent in the court's opinion.
First, allowing lenders to foreclose without liability "would convert
CERCLA into an insurance scheme for financial institutions, protect-
ing them against possible losses due to the security of loans with pol-
luted properties."' 65 Second, the court stated that lenders could "pro-
tect themselves by making prudent loans."' 68 Finally, the court opined
that lenders are in a good position to police the environmental problems
of their debtors. 6" In Mirabile the court also recognized these policy
issues, but believed Congress had not chosen to impose such liability on
lenders.16 8 Therefore, the courts should not do so.' 6 9
4. Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co.
The district court in Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufac-
turing Co.'7° considered both lender management participation and the
owner liability of a foreclosing lender. In Guidice the National Bank of
the Commonwealth (Bank) held a mortgage on contaminated property
which had been operated by Berlin Metal Polishers (Berlin). 7 ' After
Berlin defaulted on its loan and prior to foreclosure, the Bank was in-
volved with the debtor as follows: (1) Bank inquired into Berlin's ac-
counts, personnel changes, and the presence of raw materials at the
facility; (2) Bank actively assisted Berlin in applying for SBA financ-
ing; (3) Bank contacted the state environmental agency and assisted
Berlin with wastewater discharge compliance; (4) a Bank agent in-
spected the property and reported to the Bank; and (5) Bank referred a
164. Id. at 579.
165. Id. at 580.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Obviously, imposition of liability on secured creditors or lending institutions
would enhance the government's chances of recovering its cleanup costs, given the fact
that owners and operators of hazardous waste dumpsites are often elusive, defunct, or
otherwise judgment proof. It may well be that the imposition of such liability would
help to ensure more responsible management of such sites. The consideration of such
policy matters, and the decision as to the imposition of such liability, however, lies with
Congress.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,997.
169. Id.
170. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
171. Id. at 557-58.
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potential lessee of the site to Berlin. 172 The Guidice court cited the
holding in Mirabile and the district court decision in Fleet Factors, and
held that "these activities prior to foreclosure [are] insufficient to void
the security interest exemption of CERCLA."'1 73 The court reasoned
that a secured lender must control the "operational, production, or
waste disposal activities" of the debtor to be deemed participating in
the management of the facility. 74
The court in Guidice also articulated policy reasons for upholding
the Bank's exemption in this situation:
To encourage banks to monitor a debtor's use of security property, a
high liability threshold will enhance the dual purposes of protection of
the banks' investments and promoting CERCLA's policy goals. Con-
versely, a low liability standard would encourage a lender to terminate
its association with a financially troubled debtor and expedite loan
payments in an effort to recover the debts.175
Eventually, the Bank foreclosed on the Berlin facility and pur-
chased the property at the foreclosure sale. 7 In considering the Bank's
liability after foreclosure, the Guidice court essentially adopted the
Maryland Bank & Trust rationale. The court held that a mortgagee
which purchases mortgaged property at a foreclosure sale becomes an
"owner" under CERCLA section 101(20)(A). 77 Significantly, the
Guidice court found further support for its holding in SARA. SARA
amended the definition of "owner or operator" to exclude any "State or
local government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily
through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment," or other involun-
tary means. 78 Congress did not simultaneously exclude private lenders
acquiring property through foreclosure. This fact, the Guidice court
reasoned, evidenced Congress' intent that foreclosing lenders be liable
as owners.179
172. Id. at 562.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 559.
177. Id. at 563.
178. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
179. 732 F. Supp. at 563; see infra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
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B. Judicially Created Liability-"The Capacity to Influence"
1. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.18 is the first appellate deci-
sion interpreting the scope of the secured creditor exemption. 181 The
Eleventh Circuit narrowly construed the secured creditor exemption
and held that a lender may lose the statutory protection by becoming
too involved in the financial management of the borrower's business. 182
In 1976, Fleet Factors Corporation (Fleet) entered into a factoring
agreement with Swainsboro Print Works (SPW), a textile printing
company. Under the financing arrangement, Fleet advanced operating
funds to SPW in exchange for an assignment of SPW's accounts re-
ceivable. Fleet also received a security interest in all of SPW's inven-
tory, fixtures, and equipment, and a "deed to secure debt"' 83 on SPW's
real property.
SPW filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in August 1979. With
bankruptcy court approval, Fleet continued to make secured advances
to SPW as debtor-in-possession. 84 SPW halted production in early
1981 after Fleet ceased advancing funds for operation.' 85 In December
1981, SPW was adjudicated a bankrupt under chapter 7 and the bank-
ruptcy court appointed a trustee to supervise the liquidation of assets.
After SPW ceased operations in early 1981, Fleet became involved
in winding down the debtor's affairs. The United States alleged that
Fleet required SPW to get Fleet's approval before making shipments.
Fleet also allegedly established inventory prices, determined shipment
priorities, determined employee layoffs, supervised office administra-
tion, processed SPW's tax forms, and controlled plant access. 186
With bankruptcy court approval, Fleet foreclosed on its security
interest in SPW's inventory and equipment in May 1982. Fleet then
180. 901 F.2d 1550 (1 1th Cir. 1990). The facts in this section are found at 901 F.2d 1552-
53 unless otherwise indicated.
181. Decided May 23, 1990. Id. On January 14, 1991, the Supreme Court declined to con-
sider the issues raised in Fleet Factors, Fleet Factors Corp. v. United States, No. 90-504 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1991). See 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1675 (Jan. 18, 1991).
182. Id.
183. Fleet's security interest in SPW's plant was evidenced by an instrument entitled "Deed
with Power of Sale to Secure Debt." Brief of Appellant Fleet Factors Corp. at 5, United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (lth Cir. 1990) (No. 89-8094) (hereinafter Fleet Brief).
184. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 957 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
185. Fleet determined that SPW's debt to Fleet exceeded the estimated value of SPW's
accounts receivable. 724 F. Supp. at 958.
186. 901 F.2d at 1559.
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contracted with an auctioneer to sell the inventory and equipment. The
auctioneer sold the collateral "as is" and "in place" in June
1982. Fleet did not bid at the auction. Further, Fleet never foreclosed
on nor took legal title to the debtor's real property.
The United States alleged that, following the auction, Fleet en-
gaged Nix Riggers (Nix) to remove remaining unsold equipment and
leave the plant "broom clean."18' Purchasers were to remove their own
equipment. Sometime during the auction and equipment removal activ-
ities, hazardous substances were released at the site. The United States
asserted that the auctioneer moved drums of toxic chemicals, causing a
release. The government further alleged that Nix and the equipment
buyers knocked friable asbestos loose during equipment removal
activities.
In 1984, EPA conducted a two-phase cleanup of the SPW facility.
First, EPA removed 700 drums of hazardous chemicals. 188 Second,
EPA removed forty-four truckloads of asbestos-containing material. In
both phases, EPA incurred response costs of about $375,000.189 In
1987, the United States filed this cost recovery action under CERCLA.
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed Fleet's involvement with SPW dur-
ing three different time periods: (1) 1976 to early 1981, when Fleet
supplied funds for SPW's ongoing activities; (2) early 1981 until June
1982, after SPW ceased production and before Fleet foreclosed on its
security interest, during which Fleet was involved in winding down
SPW's affairs; and (3) June 1982 to December 1983, from Fleet's fore-
closure until Nix Riggers left the facility. 190
The Eleventh Circuit held that Fleet's activities during either the
second or third periods, if proven, were sufficient to incur CERCLA
liability. In so holding, the court articulated a new standard for deter-
mining lender liability under CERCLA:
187. 724 F. Supp. at 958.
188. On January 20, 1984, federal EPA and Georgia EPD officials conducted a pre-
liminary site investigation and found that the Swainsboro site contained 700 damaged
drums of flammable and nonflammable wastes (paint pigments, dyes, and solvents)
caustic soda and silicate of soda. Several vats and a drum of sodium cyanide were also
found.
Brief for the United States as Appellee at 16, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp.
955 (11th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-8094) (hereinafter U.S. Brief).
189. U.S. Brief, supra note 188, at 17.
190. 901 F.2d at 1559-60; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit at 4, U.S. Supreme Court (October Term 1990) (filed
September 22, 1990, by Petitioner, Fleet Factors Corp.) (copy supplied by King & Spalding,
Washington D.C., one of Petitioner's attorneys) (hereinafter Fleet Petition for Cert.).
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[A] secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability, without
being an operator, by participating in the financial management of a
facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured
creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the
facility in order to be liable-although such conduct will certainly
lead to the loss of the protection of the statutory exemption. 91
The court in Fleet Factors adopted the United States' questionable
framing of the liability issue. The government contended that Fleet
could be liable either as an "operator" or by holding an indicia of own-
ership and managing the facility "to the extent necessary to remove it
from the secured creditor exception." '192 The court chose to "forgo an
analysis of Fleet's liability as an operator," and proceeded under the
government's second theory. 193 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit appears to
have fashioned a new basis for liability. Under the Eleventh Circuit's
approach, a lender with quasi-owner status (by virtue of holding indicia
of ownership) coupled with quasi-operator involvement (participating
in financial management) can be liable as a hybrid owner-operator.
This approach is based, not on the liability provisions of CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a),194 but on an exception to the definition of "owner or oper-
ator" in section 101(20)(A).1 95
2. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.
A few months after the Eleventh Circuit's Fleet Factors decision,
the Ninth Circuit had occasion to consider the scope of the secured
creditor exemption in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.198 The court in Berg-
soe affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Port of St.
Helens, an Oregon municipal corporation.1 97
In Bergsoe the Port of St. Helens (Port) issued industrial develop-
ment revenue bonds to finance construction of a lead recycling plant.1 98
The United States National Bank of Oregon (Bank) became the trus-
191. 901 F.2d at 1557-58.
192. Id. at 1556 n.6. For the origin of this construction, see U.S. Brief, supra note 188, at
36 (statement of issue III).
193. 901 F.2d at 1556 n.6.
194. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
195. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
196. No. 89-35397, slip op. 8627 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1990).
197. Id. at 8628.
198. Id. at 8631.
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tee for the bondholders and also purchased the bonds.'99 Initially, the
Port and Bergsoe executed a sale-and-lease-back agreement, whereby
the Port received a deed to the real estate and Bergsoe made lease
payments matching the bond repayment schedule.2 0 The Port subse-
quently mortgaged the realty to the Bank and assigned all rights under
the lease to the Bank.20 1 Bergsoe was then obligated to pay all relevant
payments directly to the Bank.202 In short, the Port served merely as a
conduit for bond issuance and had no further involvement in the
project.
When Bergsoe defaulted on the leases, the Bank and Bergsoe
agreed on a workout plan and hired a management corporation to man-
age the facility.203 The Port signed off on various workout docu-
ments.20 4 Ultimately, the Bank and the bankruptcy trustee filed suit
against the owners of Bergsoe to recover the debt and obtain a declara-
tion of liability for cleaning up contamination which had been discov-
ered in the interim. 0 5 The defendants filed a third party complaint
against the Port for cleanup costs under CERCLA.0 6
The Ninth Circuit found that the Port held only a security interest
to ensure Bergsoe's payment on the leases and bonds. Therefore, the
Port came within the scope of the security interest exemption.0 7 The
court further held that the Port had not participated in the manage-
ment of the Bergsoe facility. 208 However, the court declined to establish
a Ninth Circuit standard for "participation in management." The court
stated: "It is clear from the statute that, whatever the precise parame-
ters of 'participation,' there must be some actual management of the
facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the exception. Here
there was none, and we therefore need not engage in line drawing. '20 9
There is disagreement over whether the Bergsoe decision conflicts
with the Fleet Factors holding. In a footnote the Bergsoe court stated:
"Merely having the power to get involved in management, but failing
199. Id. at 8632.
200. Id. at 8631-32.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 8632.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 8633.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 8634.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 8636.
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to exercise it, is not enough" to lose secured creditor protection.21 0
Some observers argue that this conflicts with the "capacity to influ-
ence" language of the Fleet standard."' However, in Fleet Factors it
was undisputed that the lender exercised extensive financial manage-
ment of the debtor's affairs. 2 In contrast, the court in Bergsoe explic-
itly found that the Port exercised no actual management of the facility
(financial or otherwise).2 1 3 On its face then, the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion does not appear to conflict with the Fleet standard.1
C. Statutory Construction of the Secured Creditor Exemption
The interpretation of the secured creditor exemption by the Elev-
enth Circuit in Fleet Factors is difficult to reconcile with established
rules of statutory construction. A statutory exception, by definition, de-
fines a specific situation in which the general rule does not apply. 215
The secured creditor exemption is an exception to the definition of
"owner or operator."2 6 If a party meets the criteria of the exception,
then it does not fall within the scope of the general definition. But, the
converse is not necessarily true. That is, not every party which fails to
satisfy the exception falls within the general definition. For example, a
transporter does not become an "owner or operator" just because it is
not a secured creditor.
Furthermore, the definition in CERCLA section 101(20)(A) does
not independently impose liability. Liability is imposed by section
107(a), which clearly applies only to "owners or operators." Therefore,
regardless of the route taken, a court must arrive at the conclusion that
a party is either an "owner" or an "operator" to impose liability under
section 107(a). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors con-
cluded that CERCLA "explicitly holds secured creditors liable if they
participate in the management of a facility.121 7 There is no such lan-
guage in section 107, the provision which creates liability.2 1 8
210. Id. at 8638 n.3.
211. IV Superfund Rep. (Inside EPA) No. 18, at 3 (Aug. 29, 1990).
212. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
213. Bergsoe, slip op. at 8636.
214. Nevertheless, attorneys for Fleet Factors Corp. described the Bergsoe opinion as being
"in tension" with Fleet. Fleet Petition for Cert., supra note 190, at 6.
215. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.11 (4th ed. 1984).
216. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
217. 901 F.2d at 1557.
218. Apparently, the court in Fleet Factors somehow found a liability provision written in
invisible ink outside of CERCLA section 107. The court stated: "[The phrase 'participating in
19911
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It stands to reason that the secured creditor exemption was in-
tended to clarify (however ineffective the attempt may have been) that
a secured creditor is not to be considered an "owner" merely by hold-
ing a security interest in contaminated property. This is a logical "clar-
ification" considering the different common law theories of mortgage
ownership. 219 However, Congress did not intend for a secured creditor
which actually operates a facility to escape liability. So Congress added
a qualification to the secured creditor exception for a party which par-
ticipates in the management of the facility. Without this limitation on
the exemption, an operator could have avoided liability by taking a se-
curity interest in the facility. This common sense approach seems pref-
erable to a tortured analysis of the ambiguous and contradictory legis-
lative history of the provision.220
Finally, the "extremely liberal" construction given statutes en-
acted to protect public health221 should not apply equally to an excep-
tion. There is little doubt that CERCLA should be broadly interpreted
to achieve its "overwhelmingly remedial" purpose.222 But, when Con-
gress wrote an exception into the liability structure, it made a policy
decision that other considerations outweighed CERCLA's remedial
purpose in that specific situation. The courts should not substitute their
policy positions for those of Congress, even if they make good sense. 2 3
V. THE FUTURE OF LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
The parameters of lender liability for Superfund cleanups is rap-
idly evolving. Early cases, such as United States v. Mirabile, confirm-
ing that lenders could be liable for the environmental misdeeds of bor-
the management' and the term 'operator' are not congruent. Under the standard we adopt today,
a secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability, without being an operator . Id. at
1557 (emphasis added). Nowhere did the court find that Fleet was an owner.
In its petition for certiorari, Fleet states: "The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of CERCLA
turns the statute on its head by using the exemption to subject, lenders to liability rather than to
shield lenders from liability." Fleet Petition for Cert., supra note 190, at 8. The court in Fleet
Factors apparently adopted this questionable theory of liability from the United States' framing
of the issues in its brief. U.S. Brief, supra note 188, at 36 (statement of issue III).
219. Three theories of mortgage property interests exist in the United States today: title
theory, lien theory, and intermediate theory. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW § 4.1 (2d ed. 1985). In a title theory jurisdiction, the argument for finding a mortgagee an
"owner" would be stronger.
220. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
221. 3A N. SINGER, supra note 219, § 71.02; see Note, supra note 34, at 1292.
222. See cases cited supra note 37 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
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rowers, shocked the financial community.224 But, under the Mirabile
standard, a lender may lose secured creditor protection only by partici-
pating in the day-to-day operational aspects of the facility. 225 The
Mirabile rationale is generally consistent with prevailing debtor-credi-
tor principles.22 6 The Eleventh Circuit's Fleet Factors decision goes far
beyond the Mirabile standard and imposes liability on lenders with the
"capacity to influence" hazardous waste disposal decisions of
borrowers. 2 7
A. Legislative Proposals
The Fleet Factors case "galvanized the banking community into a
major lobbying effort seeking congressional action to protect lenders
from Superfund [liability] .'22' This lobbying effort resulted in several
proposals in the 101st Congress to further protect lenders and related
governmental entities.
The most prominent proposal, H.R. 4494,229 was introduced by
Representative John LaFalce (D-NY), Small Business Committee
Chairman. The bill had two cosponsors and drew 245 supporters.230
H.R. 4494 would exclude from CERCLA liability foreclosing lenders
and fiduciaries which take title or control of contaminated trust or es-
tate property. A companion bill, H.R. 4076,231 would exempt federal
bank-related entities. S. 2827,232 introduced by Senator Jake Garn (R-
Utah), contained similar exculpatory provisions which would amend
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
224. See Burcat, supra note 16.
225. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
226. Burcat, supra note 16, at 535.
227. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58.
228. IV Superfund Rep. (Inside EPA) No. 20, at 4 (Sept. 26, 1990).
229. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (To amend the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to limit the liability under that Act of
lending institutions acquiring facilities through foreclosure or similar means and corporate fiducia-
ries administering estates or trusts) (introduced Apr. 4, 1990).
230. As listed on the July 11, 1990 printing of the bill.
231. H.R. 4076, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (To amend the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 to exempt a Federal department, agency,
or instrumentality from liability under that Act when a facility is conveyed to the department,
agency, or instrumentality due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or simi-
lar means) (introduced Feb. 22, 1990).
232. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (To improve the administration of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and to make technical amendments to the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act) (introduced June 28, 1990).
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B. EPA's Proposed Interpretive Rule
In response to these legislative moves, EPA made a dramatic pol-
icy shift."' EPA had opposed previous efforts to increase lender protec-
tion.2 34 But, on August 2, 1990, EPA stated that it now supports "a
rule or legislation that defines a 'safe harbor' in which lenders could
take responsible actions without incurring CERCLA liability." ' 5 How-
ever, EPA strongly favors "administrative clarification" (rather.than
legislation) for addressing the "legitimate concerns" of the financial
community. 3' The United States Department of Justice supports
EPA's rulemaking approach.2 3 7 Environmentalists and chemical indus-
try representatives side with EPA and oppose congressional change to
CERCLA liability.23 8
Notwithstanding the congenial rhetoric, EPA's policy shift "of
major proportions" does not represent a philosophical shift. 3 Instead,
it is merely a "pragmatic response to a frontal attack on the CERCLA
liability scheme."240
EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, James Strock,
stressed there should be three prerequisites to lender protection: (1) an
obligation of due diligence investigations, (2) reasonable response upon
discovering contamination on acquired property, and (3) if Superfund
pays for a cleanup, EPA should be able to recoup its costs.2 4 1 Of
course, how these goals are to be achieved is the crucial question.
Strock stated: "The goal of our efforts should be to interpret .. .(the
'secured creditor' exemption) to allow lenders to foreclose on property
and to conduct loan workouts so they could protect their 'security inter-
233. IV Superfund Rep. (Inside EPA), No. 17, at 3 (Aug. 15, 1990).
234. In 1989, an EPA administrator testified against an earlier version of legislation to pro-
tect lenders. On July 19, 1990, an EPA administrator declined to take a position on proposed
legislation at a Senate Banking Committee hearing. Id.
235. Lender Liability Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of James Strock, Assistant Admin.
for Enforcement, EPA).
236. Id. "Specifically, EPA will use its authority to promulgate a rule, which we would
issue expeditiously, to preserve the CERCLA 'security interest exemption' and avoid the poten-
tially inequitable treatment of both public and private lenders, as well as similarly situated federal
agencies." Id.
237. IV Superfund Rep. (Inside EPA) No. 18, at 8 (Aug. 29, 1990).
238. See reports cited supra note 22.
239. Telephone interview with William H. Frank, Special Assistant to the Assistant Admin-
istrator for Enforcement, EPA, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1990).
240. Id.
241. Lender Liability Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of James Strock, Assistant Admin.
for Enforcement, EPA).
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est' without triggering CERCLA liability. 24 2
Despite lingering issues, EPA seems generally tuned in to lenders'
primary concerns.243 EPA's proposed interpretive rule24 recognizes a
lender's need to manage loans and protect collateral value without in-
curring CERCLA liability. The proposal outlines five main factors con-
cerning a lender's eligibility for exemption from Superfund liability.
1. Making a Loan24
When making a loan, a lender must act "primarily to protect a
security interest. '246 To satisfy this criterion, a lender has an affirma-
tive duty to undertake "an inspection or audit of the collateral. 24 7 This
inquiry should serve the dual purposes of minimizing environmental lia-
bility and properly assessing the value of the collateral.2 4 The proposed
rule gives no guidance as to what constitutes an appropriate environ-
mental assessment.
2. Policing the Loan249
EPA's proposal allows lenders to take steps to ensure environmen-
tal responsibility of the borrower without risking CERCLA liability.
During the life of the loan, a lender may monitor the collateral or the
242. Lender Liability Hearing, supra note 20 (statement of James Strock, Assistant Admin.
for Enforcement, EPA).
243. One administrator expressed EPA's view as follows: "If a banker's going to act as a
banker-then he shouldn't be liable. But if a banker's going to act as a hazardous waste manage-
ment operator-he should be liable." Telephone interview with William H. Frank, Special Assis-
tant to the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, EPA, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 1990).
Mr. Frank pointed out that EPA has gone to great lengths to develop a rule which uses terms and
concepts common to the banking industry. EPA has spent days in technical work sessions with
lenders, attorneys, business representatives, and federal banking agencies, trying to define terms
and conform regulatory concepts to the real world. Id.
244. When this manuscript was submitted, EPA's proposed rule was undergoing review in
the Office of Management and Budget and was not yet public. A prepublication draft of the
proposal was reprinted in 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990).
245. Id. at 1164.
246. Id.
247. Id. The environmental assessment requirement is prospective only and does not apply
to existing loans. Id. at 1167 n.3. The effect of affirmative requirements imposed by this interpre-
tive rule is questionable. Interpretive rules merely explain or clarify existing law, and do not cre-
ate new duties. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985). The thread con-
necting CERCLA's secured creditor exemption with an affirmative duty to conduct environmental
assessments on proposed collateral is quite thin indeed.
248. 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1164.
249. Id.
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debtor's business, require cleanup activities, demand assurance of com-
pliance with environmental laws, or impose other reasonable conditions
to police the loan.25 Lenders may write such conditions into the loan
agreement.251 Furthermore, the rule explicitly states that "a lender is
not expected to be an insurer or guarantor of environmental safety. 2 52
3. Loan Work Out25 3
Under certain conditions, the proposed rule would allow lenders to
"work out" a loan with a troubled borrower. To preserve secured credi-
tor protection: (1) the lender must take such actions "in an effort to
prevent default of the loan or diminution of the value of the collateral";
(2) the lender must "duly consider and account for the hazardous sub-
stances known to be present at the facility, and must not cause or con-
tribute by act or omission to the environmental harm at issue"; and (3)
"the borrower [must] remain[] the ultimate decision maker for opera-
tion at the facility."25 4 Examples of permissible activities include re-
structuring the loan, assessing additional interest, extending the pay-
ment due date, and giving general advice (including operational
advice) .255
4. Foreclosure and Liquidation2 51
Foreclosure on the collateral or acquisition of title by foreclosure
or similar proceedings will not subject the secured lender to CERCLA
"owner" liability.'" However, the acquisition of title must be only
'temporary" and "reasonably necessary to ensure satisfaction or per-
formance of the loan obligation."2 58 If a lender holds title to the facility
too long, the property may be considered an investment, which is be-
yond the scope of the secured creditor exemption.2 59 A foreclosing
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. For purposes of this rule, a lender holding property after foreclosure for six
months or fewer is presumed to be holding to protect the security interest. However, if
the lender has not divested itself of the property within this time, the burden shifts to
the lender to demonstrate that it continues to hold the property primarily to protect the
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lender also may undertake responsible actions to wind up debtor's oper-
ations and liquidate the collateral without incurring liability.260 How-
ever, if the lender's actions "cause or contribute to environmental con-
tamination" the lender may be charged with cleanup costs.2"'
5. No Windfall to Lenders
The proposed rule contemplates that lenders should not be allowed
to profit from government cleanup of contaminated collateral.262 If
EPA cleans up property in which a lender holds indicia of ownership,
and the lender profits from the property's increased value, EPA will
seek reimbursement for the increased value attributable to cleanup.
2 63
EPA's mechanism for recovery in this instance is "equitable reimburse-
ment, under applicable principles of law."264 It is unclear what the "ap-
plicable principles of law" would be.26 5
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE Fix OR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE?
Reactions to EPA's proposed interpretive regulation to clarify
lender liability for Superfund cleanups are mixed.26 6 Supporters of
lender protection are pleased with EPA's policy reversal, but some ar-
gue that an "administrative fix" is inadequate for providing the needed
relief.26 7 James O'Brien, an attorney representing lenders, 6 ' asserts
security interest, taking all relevant facts and circumstances into account.
Id. at 1165.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. The increase in value is equal to the amount the lender realized from the foreclosure
sale, less the value of the property in its previously contaminated condition. Id.
264. Id.
265. The basis for cost recovery in this situation is particularly troublesome. It appears that
EPA would attempt to apply common-law principles. However, CERCLA arguably forecloses ap-
plication of common-law principles to cost recovery for Superfund cleanups. In 1986, SARA
added subsection 9607(1) to CERCLA's liability provisions. That subsection provides for a federal
lien to be imposed on all property cleaned up by Superfund. The provision explicitly states: "The
lien imposed by this subsection shall be subject to the rights of any purchaser, holder of a security
interest, or judgment lien creditor whose interest is perfected [before the federal lien attaches]."
42 U.S.C. § 9607(l) (emphasis added). This language seems to preclude any "equitable reim-
bursement" from a secured lender whose interest arose prior to cleanup.
266. VI Superfund Rep. (Inside EPA) No. 18, at 9 (Aug. 29, 1990); Id. No. 17, at 4 (Aug.
15, 1990).
267. O'Brien, Environmental Lender Liability: Will an Administrative Fix Work?, 5 Toxics
L. Rep. (BNA) 512 (Sept. 12, 1990); IV Superfund Rep. No. 17, at 4 (Aug. 15, 1990). O'Brien's
article was originally prepared at the request of the Subcomm. on Transp. & Hazardous Materi-
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that at best, the courts will receive some guidance from an EPA regu-
lation."8 9 Thus, the rule will not provide certainty to lenders, and will
not extend to private CERCLA actions against lenders.27
EPA disagrees, arguing that courts will afford "great deference"
to EPA's interpretation of CERCLA.27 1 In support of its position, EPA
points to the Ninth Circuit decision in Wickland Oil Terminals v.
Asarco, Inc.272 In Wickland the court adopted EPA's interpretation
that the National Contingency Plan did not require formal agency ap-
proval of a cleanup plan as a prerequisite to a private CERCLA cost
recovery action.2 73 However, the EPA interpretation in Wickland was
an interpretation of EPA's own regulations, not of the CERCLA stat-
ute itself.2 74
The United States Supreme Court outlined the deference courts
are to pay to agency statutory interpretations in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 7' The Court fashioned a
two-step analysis in Chevron for reviewing an agency's interpretation of
a statute it administers. First, the court must search for clear congres-
sional intent on the issue.276 "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 2 77 Second,
if Congress has not directly addressed the issue, the court must give
deference to the agency interpretation if it is based on a "permissible
construction of the statute. ' '27a
There is no doubt that the secured creditor exemption in CER-
CLA section 101(20)(A) is ambiguous.2 79 However, like the courts in
als of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Thomas Luken, Chairman), following Mr. O'Brien's
testimony at the Hearing on Lender Liability Under Superfund (Aug. 2, 1990). Telephone inter-
view with James P. O'Brien, Chapman & Cutler, Chicago, Illinois (Sept. 21, 1990).
268. James P. O'Brien is an attorney in the Chicago, Illinois office of Chapman & Cutler.
Mr. O'Brien served as editor and an author of ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE: THE COMPLETE
RESOURCE GUIDE FOR REAL ESTATE LENDERS, BUYERS, SELLERS, AND ATTORNEYS (J. O'Brien &
W. Frank, eds. 1989).
269. O'Brien, supra note 267.
270. Id.
271. IV Superfund Rep. (Inside EPA) No. 17, at 4 (Aug. 15, 1990).
272. 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 891.
275. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
276. Id. at 842.
277. Id. at 842-43.
278. Id. at 843.
279. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
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United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.28 and Guidice v. BFG
Electroplating & Manufacturing Co.,2"' subsequent courts could find
that Congress intended for a foreclosing lender to lose the exemption.
In fact, the court in Guidice specifically found that "the failure of the
1986 [SARA] amendments to specifically exempt mortgagees-turned-
landowners," was a persuasive indication of Congress' intent.
28 2
The rationale employed by the Guidice court is embodied in the
"doctrine of legislative reenactment. '2 3 In Lorillard v. Pons2 4 the
United States Supreme Court stated the doctrine as follows: "Congress
is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation
of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute
without change. ' 286 In considering SARA and the issue of lender liabil-
ity, the case is even stronger for finding congressional reenactment.
Congress considered the definition of "owner or operator," and
amended it to exclude state and local governments involuntarily acquir-
ing ownership. 286 But Congress did not exclude foreclosing lenders.
Thus, a very real possibility exists that some courts would find congres-
sional intent contrary to EPA's proposed interpretive rule. If a court
finds that SARA evinces congressional intent to hold foreclosing lend-
ers liable as owners, "that is the end of the matter. '2 7
VII. CONCLUSION
CERCLA may well be the most radical liability scheme ever de-
veloped in the United States. It was designed to address an environ-
mental problem of massive proportions-cleaning up contaminated in-
active and abandoned hazardous waste sites. CERCLA's structure is
inherently unfair in some applications. This reflects Congress' policy
decision that CERCLA's overwhelmingly remedial goals outweigh the
cost CERCLA imposes on businesses responsible for environmental
problems. However, as the court in Mirabile observed, the polluter
pays principle "simply does not apply with the same force to secured
280. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
281. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
282. Id. at 563.
283. The "doctrine of legislative reenactment" is not specifically referred to by the court in
Guidice. For discussions of the doctrine, see Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1989);
and 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.09 (4th ed. 1973).
284. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
285. Id. at 580.
286. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
287. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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creditors" as it does to persons more directly involved with hazardous
waste activities.2"' Congress explicitly recognized this problem in draft-
ing the secured creditor exemption.
Even without the risk of CERCLA liability, lenders have a strong
incentive to investigate a borrower's environmental practices and the
environmental history of proposed collateral. Obviously, the lender
wants to realize the anticipated return on the loan. If hazardous waste
problems develop on the collateral, it will seriously impair debtor's abil-
ity to repay the loan and may well render the collateral worthless.
In Fleet Factors the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that imposing lia-
bility on financial institutions will encourage them to become "environ-
mental policemen. ' 189 Undoubtedly, lender liability under CERCLA
will increase pretransaction environmental investigations. Lenders,
however, are unlikely to actively monitor debtors during the life of the
loan, for fear of incurring quasi-owner/quasi-operator liability as fash-
ioned by the court in Fleet Factors. Furthermore, lenders will avoid
becoming involved in workouts involving cleanups or other response ac-
tivities. To encourage secured creditors to monitor borrowers' activities,
creditors should be afforded protection for becoming involved, not lia-
bility.2"' As stated above, lenders already have a compelling motive to
investigate environmental issues of a potential debtor.
Finally, either EPA or Congress will be changing the standard of
Superfund lender liability in the near future. Should this type of
change in the statutory structure be accomplished administratively?
The answer is a resounding no. The question of lender liability under
CERCLA is purely a policy decision. Superfund's broad remedial goals
must be balanced against the impact on the financial community,
which is only remotely connected to actual waste disposal. In short,
how far does the "polluter pays" principle extend?
Society has affirmed that environmental values transcend tradi-
288. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,995.
289. Our ruling today should encourage potential creditors to investigate thoroughly
the waste treatment systems and policies of potential debtors .... Similarly, creditors'
awareness that they are potentially liable under CERCLA will encourage them to mon-
itor the hazardous waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist upon
compliance with acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and fu-
ture financial support.
Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558 (citations omitted).
290. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Lender Liability Hearing, supra
note 20 (statement of James W. Nelson, on behalf of Mortgage Bankers Association of America).
But see id. (statement of Donald S. Strait, Senior Project Attorney, Natural Resources Defense
Council).
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tional economic considerations of land use, at least in some situations.
But this affirmation is far from complete. If the costs become too per-
sonal, society's eagerness for environmental regulation often dimin-
ishes.2 9 1 Thus, the debate rages over whose economic interests are to be
subordinated to the greater good of society and how such mechanisms
should operate.
This policy decision does not call for "great expertise" of a tech-
nology-oriented agency "charged with the responsibility for administer-
ing the provision. '"292 The only "technical" provisions involve financial
matters within the lending industry. Surely, Congress is better
equipped to make such policy decisions than is EPA.
The argument for congressional action is even stronger in this case
because CERCLA provides EPA with no clear standard on which to
base interpretation of the secured creditor exemption. In United States
v. Robel29  Justice Brennan wrote: "Formulation of policy is a legisla-
ture's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the electorate, and to
the extent Congress delegates authority under indefinite standards, this
policy-making function is passed on to other agencies, often not an-
swerable or responsive in the same degree to the people."' 294 Congress
should not "throw the mess into the lap of an administrative agency"
merely to avoid making difficult decisions. 29 5
Neither the courts nor the banking industry have ever been sure
about what Congress intended by the secured creditor exemption. Con-
gress has an opportunity to remedy that problem. Our representative
assembly should not abdicate its decision-making responsibility by ask-
ing an administrative agency to articulate national policy. 96
G. Alan Perkins
291. Blake, The Economic Impacts of Environmental Regulation, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Summer 1990, at 23.
292. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
293. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
294. Id. at 276.
295. Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 585-86 (1972); see also
Frohmayer, Of Legislative Intent, the Perils of Legislative Abdication, and the Growth of Admin-
istrative and Judicial Power, 22 WILLIAMETTE L. REv. 219 (1986).
296. This is particularly true with CERCLA because the agency has little to go on. The
legislative history of CERCLA is shrouded in mystery. Thus, almost any interpretation will be
difficult to refute. When Congress delegates authority to an agency, it should provide the agency
with clear standards. Frohmayer, supra note 295, at 235-36.
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